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in the Ethanol Industry
Philip Kenkel and Rodney B. Holcomb
While agricultural economics literature has become rife with the economics of ethanol
production and cellulosic ethanol feedstock production, little has been written about capital
investment necessary for the magnitude of industry development mandated by the Energy
Security and Independence Act of 2007. Financing the development of the ethanol industry to
meet the 36 billion gallon production capacity set for 2022 (with 16 billion gallons from
cellulosic ethanol) will require capital investments exceeding $100 billion for production
facilities, plus extensive investment in feedstock establishment and transportation/handling
infrastructure. Federal support associated with political mandates does not address all of the
financial issues related with the development of the industry in such a relatively short
timeframe. This article addresses the challenges associated with and the conditions necessary
for achieving the private investment needed to expand the ethanol industry in the United
States.
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The Energy Security and Independence Act of
2007 established both a timeline and targeted
production/utilization goals for renewable fuels
in the US By 2022 U.S. renewable fuel pro-
duction must grow to 36 billion gallons, with
16 billion gallons supplied by cellulosic etha-
nol. Current ethanol production capacity, in-
cluding both operating plants and plants under
construction/expansion, is approximately 11
billion gallons (Renewable Fuels Association,
2008). Virtually all of this current production
capacity isgrain-based,withonly traceamounts
of ethanol derived from nongrain feedstocks.
The development of the cellulosic ethanol in-
dustry will also require the establishment of
dedicated energy crops and the infrastructure
for the harvesting, handling and storage of
feedstocks.
Meeting the renewable fuel mandate of the
2007 Act will require an investment in facili-
ties, transportation and storage infrastructure,
and feedstock production that could total over
$100 billion in a timeframe of just over a de-
cade. The development of this infrastructure
will be one of the greatest challenges for rural
America since the advent of rural electrifica-
tion in the 1930s. Rural electrification was
originally funded by a $40 million loan pro-
gram established by the Rural Electrification
Act (REA) of 1936 (Carmody, 1939). De-
pending upon the inflator used, the original
REA program value would equate to $480
million in current dollars, or less than five per-
cent of the anticipated investment to establish
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2007 Act. Unlike rural electrification, meeting
the mandates of the 2007 Act requires the
commercialization of currently unproven
technologies for deriving ethanol from bio-
mass. An entire industry, required by mandate,
has yet to be formed. Despite the extensive
discussion of biomass values and cellulosic
ethanol production issues in the current litera-
ture, the challenge of financing the expansion
of the U.S. renewable fuel infrastructure has
not been adequately addressed.
Development of the Grain-Based Ethanol
Industry
While ethanol had been used in motor vehicles
in the U.S. since the Model T rolled off as-
sembly lines in 1908, the U.S. ethanol industry
did not develop until the 1970s, encouraged by
state and federal tax incentives and mandates for
oxygenated gasoline. Ethanol production grew
from 175 million gallons in 1980 to 900 million
in 1990 and 1.6 billion gallons in 2000 (Re-
newable Fuels Association, 2008). In 2007 the
U.S. produced 6.5 billion gallons of ethanol.
Production in 2008 is forecast at 8.5 billion
gallons. Current ethanol production capacity
including both operating plants and plants under
construction/expansion is approximately 11
billion gallons (Renewable Fuels Association,
2008). This growth trend occurred despite some
periods of time with unfavorable corn/ethanol
price ratios. During the mid-1980s, 88 ethanol
plants (mostly smaller plants) closed down
(USDA). Ethanol production alsodeclined fora
brief period in 1995–1996. Despite these blips,
the industry has successfully attracted an un-
precedented amount of capital to rural projects.
Avariety of policy incentives contributed to
the growth of the grain-based ethanol industry
(Koplow, 2006). The Energy Security Act of
1980 instituted federally insured loans for
ethanol facilities. The Crude Oil Windfall
Profits Tax Act of 1980 initiated tax credits for
ethanol blenders. This credit has undergone
several revisions and has remained as an im-
portant incentive for ethanol production. Its
current version, the Volumetric Ethanol Excise
Tax Credit (VEETC) provides a $0.51 credit for
each gallon of pure ethanol blended into gas-
oline. The credit can only be used at one level
of the supply chain by the registered blender.
Additional support for developing ethanol fa-
cilities was provided by the small producer tax
credit first passed in the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990. The subsidy pro-
vided a $0.10/gallon credit on the first 15
million gallons produced by plants with a
nameplate capacity under 30 million gallons.
The capacity limit was doubled to 60 million
gallons in the Energy Policy Act of 2005.
Ethanol import tariffs were also created to help
support the domestic ethanol industry. Ethanol
imports are subject to a 2.5% ad valorem tariff
and a $0.54/gallon secondary tariff. An ex-
emption from the secondary tariff is made for
an amount up to 7% of U.S. ethanol production
imported from the Caribbean Basin nations.
Policies designed to stimulate ethanol con-
sumption have also been enacted. The Energy
Policy Act of 2005 established minimum con-
sumption per year of ethanol and other re-
newable fuels. These minimums, commonly
referred to as ‘‘Renewable Fuel Standards’’
(RFS), set minimum consumption levels of 7.5
billion gallons by 2012. Incentives for the
production of E-85 compatible vehicles and
E-85 fueling infrastructure were also put in
place to stimulate consumption. Federal incen-
tives for ethanol have also been complimented
by a variety of programs at the state level tar-
geting both production and consumption.
While policy incentives helped initiate the
grain-based ethanol industry, technology stan-
dardization, information technology, and the
development of appropriate business models
have been major factors in its growth and ex-
pansion. In their article discussing the role of
information technology on the growth of the
ethanol industry, Crooks and Dunn (2005)
discussed the role of standardized technology.
In the early 1990s ethanol project developers
had to go through a very traditional construc-
tion process which involved hiring a process
management firm, an engineering design firm,
as well as a construction management firm. The
lack of experience at every level of the process
added to costs and start-up problems. As ex-
perience in ethanol developed a few prominent
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sign technology that cut construction costs in
half while reducing project development time
by 6–9 months (Crooks and Dunn, 2005). The
designs also increased conversion yields while
reducing operating costs.
Technology standardization in grain-based
ethanol production resulted in the development
of ‘‘cookie cutter ethanol plants’’ which mini-
mized construction time while offering pre-
dictable construction costs and operating
performance. Information technology such as
distributed control systems which allowed the
design/builder firms to simultaneously monitor
and manage the operations of multiple plants
supported this business model. The develop-
ment of procurement, management, marketing,
and even project development partnerships
helped producer groups and investors to out-
source almost everystageofthe project(Crooks
and Dunn, 2005). This standardized technology
allowed new plants to routinely exceed their
nameplate capacity, reducing the risk of the
venture from the lender’s perspective (Bryan,
2003).
Through the early growth stage of the grain-
based ethanol industry, local farmers and
business people were the primary developers of
ethanol projects. Producer investment was
driven by a desire to add value and/or mitigate
the price swings of their corn production. Local
project teams identified site locations, selected
technology providers and managed the devel-
opment process with close support from the
designer/builder. Financing for the projects was
obtained from the new generation cooperative
(NGC) equity structure coupled with debt fi-
nancing provided by or coordinated by local
relationship lenders. As the size of ethanol
projectsincreased,duetosignificanteconomies
of scale, and the density of projects increased,
the capital requirements exceeded traditional
(farmer-based) equity and debt financing
models. Ethanol projects shifted toward com-
bined producer/investor business models and
soughtalargerpoolofgeneralinvestors.Project
developers began to increasingly look to rela-
tionships outside the rural community for both
the equity and debt financing (Alexander and
Alcala, 2006).
By 2003 a relatively small number of banks
were taking the lead role in providing debt fi-
nancing for ethanol ventures. Five lenders, in-
cluding CoBank, AgStar FinancialServicesand
First National Bank of Omaha, were the lead
lenders on roughly two-thirds of the existing
ethanol plants (Bryan, 2003). Theselenders had
developed the expertise to examine feasibility
studies in great depth and analyze access to
feedstocks, energy supply, transportation, wa-
ter, and other project variables. The banks’ in-
terest in ethanol projects was limited by capital
position and on how much of the banks’ total
loan portfolio they chose to make available to
the ethanol sector (Bryan, 2003).
As the ethanol industry developed, the av-
erage size of new ethanol facilities continued to
increase. In 2006 there were five ethanol plants
under construction with capacities of 100 mil-
lion gallons/year or greater. A Midwest venture
(Aventine Renewable Energy in Pekin, IL) was
undergoing an expansion to put its total ca-
pacity at 160 million gallons/year. This in-
crease in the number of large-scale projects
coincided with an increase in the number of
money-center banks lending to ethanol devel-
opers, and an increase in the number of private
equity firms investing in ethanol companies
(Alexander and Alcala, 2006). Access to this
expanded pool of capital presented new chal-
lenges for the ethanol business model. Money-
center banks had a relative lack of experience
with ethanol venture financing and did not have
long-term relationships with the developers. As
a result, these lenders demanded increased
documentation with covenants (both affirma-
tive and negative) controlling critical aspects of
business operations and applied a higher level
of scrutiny to project contracts and to project-
related risk management.
The shift toward private investors or insti-
tutional equity funds, as well as continued in-
volvement of additional local partners, also
created challenges. The expectation of the
various investors with respect to the rate of
return on equity investments, allocation of
voting rights, and control over management
had to be reconciled. The equity was typically
divided into classes, with each class having a
different rate of return on its equity investment
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had differential rights to appoint members to
the project company’s board of directors, and to
weigh the votes of each class of equity on
different types of management decisions. Cer-
tain management decisions could be taken with
the vote of less than all classes of equity in-
terests, while other decisions might require the
vote of all classes.
The institutional equity funds often
demanded covenants to recoup their initial in-
vestment before developers or local investors
became eligible for equivalent distributions.
Both institutional investors and private inves-
tors preferred structures which gave them a
higher percentage of the initial project profits
with those percentages reducing dramatically
after the amount of their initial investment had
been returned and, in many cases, a nominal
return on that investment had also been ach-
ieved (Alexander and Alcala, 2006).
Challenges in Financing the Cellulosic
Ethanol
Financing the development and expansion of
the cellulosic-based ethanol industry will be a
greater challenge relative to financing grain-
based ethanol. Cellulosic ethanol technology
has not been standardized. There are currently
competing technologies for pretreatment (acid
hydrolysis, steam explosion, ammonia fiber
expansion, alkaline wet oxidation, ozone pre-
treatment) and conversion (chemical hydroly-
sis, enzymatic hydrolysis, gasification). Cellu-
losic ethanol plants are likely to use a variety of
feedstocks (corn stover, switchgrass, mis-
canthus, wood waste) with the optimal feed-
stock depending on regional availability. The
optimal scale of a cellulosic plant involves a
tradeoff between feedstock transportation and
processing economies. The determination of
optimal plant size is just one aspect of the
standardization desperately needed in order to
attract private capital.
Technology Issues
Technological advances in cellulosic ethanol
productionarelikelytobeadouble-edgedsword.
Advances will be necessary to move the tech-
nology from the pilot plant or demonstrational
level to commercial viability. On the other hand,
private investors will be reluctant to commit
to projects if the development of superior tech-
nology appears imminent. The development of
the standardized ‘‘cookie cutter’’ cellulosic eth-
anolplantisnotlikelytooccurinthenearfuture.
Until cellulosic technology is standardized, the
benefits of standardization such as minimized
construction time, and predictable construction
costs and operating performance will not be
available to investors.
Cellulosic ethanol will require a higher
capital investment per gallon of capacity. On
February 28, 2007, the U.S. Department of
Energy announced $385 million in grant fund-
ing to six cellulosic ethanol plants (Wallace
et al., 2005) This grant funding accounts for 40%
of the investment costs. The remaining 60%
comes from the promoters of those facilities.
The total of $1 billion will be invested for ap-
proximately 140 million gallons of capacity.
This translates into $7/annual gallon production
capacity in capital investment costs for pilot
plants, although construction costs are likely to
decrease as the technology is commercialized.
Taheripour and Tyner (2008) estimate the cost
of a 100 million gallon cellulosic facility at
$400 million ($4/gallon of annual production
capacity). Even using this conservative esti-
mate, the capital cost of an additional 25 billion
gallons of capacity (the difference between the
capacity of currently operating and plants un-
der construction and the 36 billion gallon target
of the renewable fuel standard) will be $100
billion.
Feedstock Production and Handling
Another major challenge associated with pri-
vate investment in cellulosic ethanol produc-
tion relates to feedstock availability and trans-
portation/handling infrastructure. Grain-based
ethanol relied upon a readily available feed-
stock and took advantage of the storage and
transportation infrastructure that the grain in-
dustry developed extensively during the past
century. The development of cellulosic ethanol
will require investment in feedstock production
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frastructure. This will involve a substantial in-
vestment which will be influenced by feedstock
sources and other factors.
Corn stover and other crop residues have
been suggested as cellulosic ethanol feed-
stocks. Crop residues are abundant in Corn Belt
states and in certain pockets of agricultural
zones throughout the country. Crop residue
feedstocks will not require additional crop
production costs. However, they will have a
limited harvest window which will lead to
substantial storage costs for a year round sup-
ply. The density of production will depend
upon the amount of residue that can be har-
vested without sacrificing soil quality or land
cover requirements. Cellulosic ethanol facili-
ties focusing on crop residue feedstocks may
face higher investment costs in feedstock stor-
age and transportation infrastructure, relative to
their dedicated energy crop counterparts.
Many advocates of cellulosic ethanol have
suggested that dedicated energy crops, such as
switchgrass, miscanthus, and other crops, rep-
resent a greater long-term opportunity and
eventually a lower-cost feedstock for cellulosic
ethanol production. Switchgrass has received
considerable attention due to its specific in-
clusion in past Presidential State of the Union
addresses and the focus on switchgrass in var-
ious federally-sponsored renewable fuels re-
search programs. This fast-growing grass has
been touted for its ability to produce tons of
biomass on marginal land with relatively small
amounts of inputs (i.e., fertilizer and pesti-
cides). However, switchgrass and similar bio-
mass feedstock crops represent a long-term
commitment on behalf of the producer, with
little or no revenue generated in the first year of
production. Furthermore, dedicated energy
crops do not have the market flexibility of ce-
real grains, which have value in both food and
feed markets. Thus, a long-term commitment
for a dedicated energy crop places significant
risk on agricultural producers unless guarantees
and contracts are provided.
A number of switchgrass production bud-
gets have been developed in recent years to
provide an estimate of feedstock costs for cel-
lulosic ethanol plants. Some of the most recent
budgets have examined the products costs as-
sociated with switchgrass production. These
budgets estimate the costs per ton at the field
considerably higher than the $30/ton at-the-
plant prices USDA estimates are necessary to
make cellulosic ethanol cost competitive with
grain-based ethanol (Collins, 2007). Estimates
of crop establishment costs vary greatly, from
less than $150/acre to over $400/acre depend-
ing on the study and the geographic region, and
per-ton production and harvesting costs ranged
from near $20/ton to near $90/ton (e.g., Haque
et al., 2008; Perrin et al., 2007; Popp, 2007;
Bangsund, DeVuyst, and Leistriz, 2008). Sim-
ilarly, the expected yields per acre in these
studies range from less than 2 tons/acre to near
10 tons/acre. The five-year production study in
three different Midwestern states by Perrin
et al. (2007) found yields of 1.1–4 tons/acre.
These recent studies are indicators of the rela-
tively unknown and inconsistent feedstock is-
sues facing the cellulosic ethanol industry.
Using a relatively robust estimate of 5 tons/
acre, a high-end establishment cost of $400/
acre, and assuming a 90 gallon/ton conversion
rate, producing 20 billion gallons of cellulosic
ethanol from dedicated energy crops would
require over 44 million acres and an estab-
lishment investment that could near $18 billion.
Additional investment will be required for
harvesting and transportation equipment, trans-
portation infrastructure (roads, bridges and
pipelines for final product), feedstock storage
structures, and for the funds to finance the raw
material inventory.
Industry Legitimacy
An impediment to raising all of this capital
required for the cellulosic ethanol industry is
the legitimacy of the industry. Aldrich and Fiol
(1994) refer to ‘‘legitimacy’’ as an additional
hurdle faced by start-up ventures in an industry
so young that few if any precedents exist for
these ventures to follow. They point out that, in
addition to the typical pressures associated with
a start-up venture in an established industry,
a new industry with questionable legitimacy
also requires new ventures to ‘‘carve out a new
market, raise capital from skeptical sources,
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other difficulties stemming from their nascent
status.’’ Lawrence (1999) adds to this concept
by pointing that certain ‘‘legitimating’’ steps
must be taken as part of an industrial strategy to
overcome the skepticism from both those who
might be capital contributors to the venture and
those who might become customers of the firm.
A more simplistic way to make the point may
be to use the cliche ´ about the settling of the Old
West: ‘‘Pioneers got the arrows, but settlers got
the land.’’ Private investors in individual bio-
fuel ventures are looking to capture both mar-
ket share and economic rents from technology
by being early entrants in the industry, but
venture capitalists and philanthropic investors
alike still fear what Herrick (2008) calls the
‘‘cash flow ‘valley of death’’’ that exists be-
tween pilot scale technological assessment and
commercial scale production.
Cellulosic ethanol and other biofuel ven-
tures in the category referred to as ‘‘Advanced
Biofuels’’ by the RFS face challenges gaining
legitimacy. Economic feasibility depends in
part upon market mandates and incentives
which carry with them the possibility of policy
changes. Cellulosic ethanol technologies are
unproven on a commercial scale, there are ac-
cordingly no established industry norms for
these ‘‘second generation’’ technologies, and in
general there is a lack of industry leadership.
Cellulosic feedstocks do not align with the
interest of commodity and producer groups
which help promote grainbased ethanol.
Grain-based ethanol ventures of the late
1970s likewise suffered from legitimacy issues,
but during the past decade grain-based ethanol
found ways to gain legitimacy, and thus capture
greater levels of private investment. Sociopo-
litical legitimacy (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994) was
gained through the buy-in of commodity and
producer organizations, along with legislative
action to promote both ethanol production and
utilization, which made ethanol a norm in parts
of the country. External legitimacy was gained
by successful operation of a handful of Corn
Belt ethanol plants, which worked collectively
to educate the public, producers, politicians,
and private investors. Markets were formed and
expanded, technologies became so standardized
that plants had nameplate capacities and opera-
tional guarantees, employee and managerial
training programs were created, and a track
record of industry financial performance was
established. Legitimacy makes it easier for
participants in an industry to obtain resources
(Aldrich and Auster, 1986; Shane and Foo,
1999), and this theory was supported by the
influx of private investment from both Main
Street and Wall Street into the grain-based eth-
anol industry during the first half of this decade.
One could easily argue that the record grain
prices of 2007–2008 and the financial woes of
2008 have rocked the foundation of the grain-
based ethanol industry, but the same could be
said of practically any grain-based agribusiness
venture during the same time period.
Overcoming the Challenges
Just as the U.S. successfully developed an
electricity distribution infrastructure for rural
America, it is possible to overcome the barriers
of financing cellulosic ethanol production.
Overcoming the financing barriers will require
several essential elements: long-term price
competitiveness with petroleum-based fuels,
proven and standardized technology, consistent
public policy, and appropriate business models.
Competitiveness with Petroleum-Based Fuels
As in any industry, private investment capital
will flow to cellulosic ethanol if the industry is
sufficiently profitable. Over the long run, the
ethanol industry must be able to provide
transportation fuels at a lower cost relative to
petroleum-based alternatives if it is to remain
viable. Recent bankruptcies and plant closings
of grain-based ethanol and biodiesel plants
demonstrate the challenges of maintaining
profitability in a volatile price environment.
Long-term profitability provides the only
guarantee for a sustainable ethanol industry.
Proven and Standardized Technology
Cellulosic ethanol production technology is
an important prerequisite to a profitable and
competitive industry. While public policy sup-
port can encourage investment in cellulosic
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until conversion technology is commercialized
and standardized. Ethanol design firms, the
entities that must guarantee a nameplate ca-
pacity, are currently much more cautious about
the timeframe for commercialization relative to
many industry proponents. After construction,
a design firm has a short period of time, typi-
cally one to two weeks, to demonstrate that the
plant can operate at its stated capacity. Cellu-
losic ethanol production, due to its more com-
plex conversion process and variable feedstock,
faces greater challenges in optimizing pro-
cesses. Industry leadership toward one or more
standardized technology packages for cellu-
losic production will be an important step in
facilitating investment.
Leadership in cellulosic ethanol is begin-
ning to develop, as energy and automobile in-
dustry giants lend their name and dollars to
cellulosic ethanol joint ventures and strategic
alliances (Jordan and Landen, 2008). General
Motors, DuPont, Marathon Oil, and BPAmoco
are examples of well-known companies who
have either invested in or entered into strategic
alliances with cellulosic ethanol companies.
Their commitment should further removemuch
of the skepticism associated with cellulosic
ethanol, which will hopefully benefit future
ventures as they pursue private investment.
Through its technology investment agree-
ment (TIA) program, the Department of Energy
(DOE) essentially serves as a venture capital
entity for a project with sound technology, thus
providing the seed investment to hopefully
capture greater private investment. TIAs allow
the DOE to function much like the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
arm of the Department of Defense, which takes
financial stakes inprojects where both risks and
potentialpayoffsarevery largebut thepotential
for field-advancing technology warrant the ef-
forts (Herrick, 2008).
Consistent Public Policy
Policy incentives have played an important role
in the development and growth of the grain-
based ethanol industry. The RFS mandates of
16 billion gallons of ‘‘advanced’’ biofuel and
36 billion gallon of total ethanol by 2022 are
important steps in legitimizing demand for cel-
lulosic ethanol, but consistency in public policy
is necessary to draw in private investment.
Commitment by the DOE of more than $1 bil-
lion to commercial-scale cellulosic ethanol
ventures in 2007 and programs ensuring future
commitments are indicators of consistent pol-
icy and provide sociopolitical legitimacy to the
ethanol industry, which helps reassure private
investment. These DOE commitments have taken
many forms, but primarily consist of grants, co-
operative agreements, technology investment
agreements, and loan guarantees (DOE, 2007).
For the grants, the DOE acts as ‘‘a cost
sharing benefactor of equity R&D,’’ while
through the cooperative agreements the DOE
acts as ‘‘a cost sharing research/development
partner’’ (Herrick, 2008). In both cases, the
DOE is providing matching funds to support
the technological legitimacy of the industry.
The DOE’s loan guarantees place the depart-
ment on the ‘‘debt side of traditional energy
project financing’’ (Herrick, 2008). These loan
guarantees, provided for by Title 17 of the 2005
Energy Policy Act, are similar to the Business &
Industry Loan program (B&I Loans) offered
through USDA and utilized by many food and
fiber value-added ventures. B&I Loans played a
criticalroleinthefinancingofmanygrain-based
ethanol plants in the U.S., providing guaranteed
loans for ventures and alleviating equity risks of
private investors. Similarly, the DOE loan
guarantees are expected to play a critical role in
‘‘second generation’’ biofuel ventures.
Another existing policy that adds to the le-
gitimacy of the cellulosic ethanol industry is
the Biomass Crop Assistance Program initiated
by the 2008 Farm Bill. This support is expected
to draw producer support and help alleviate
uncertainty associated with input availability
(Schill, 2008). Feedstock risks are one of the
greatest issues concerning private investors in
cellulosic ethanol ventures, especially for ven-
tures dependent upon new crops such as switch-
grass for their primary feedstock.
While these existing policies will help to
overcome the challenges of private investment
for the cellulosic ethanol industry, additional
support is possible, such as, at the state and
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bonds and tax increment financing (TIF) bonds.
According to Morgan (2008), state and local
development/financing entities ‘‘have the right
to finance tax-exempt facility bonds for the
construction of solid waste disposal facilities to
be used by private companies.’’ Morgan further
points out that ‘‘at least 95% of the bonds’ net
proceeds must be used toward qualified solid
waste disposal property and equipment.’’ These
bonds, typically with a low but variable interest
rate and backed by a lending institution’s letter
of credit, may prove to be a local source of in-
vestment to cover the high costs of plant, prop-
erty, and equipment associated with ethanol
ventures, and could prove to be an important
source of funding for cellulosic projects involv-
ing wood waste or municipal waste feedstocks.
TIF bonds may also represent a local source
of investment for ethanol ventures. Morgan
(2008) points out that local or state agencies,
after issuing the bonds, can authorize the return
of specific sales and/or property tax payments
to the venture’s organizers to be used in ser-
vicing the bond debt.
Business Models
The final piece in attracting the necessary
capital to the cellulosic ethanol industry is the
development of appropriate business models.
Many early grain-based ethanol plants were
organized as New Generation Cooperatives
(NGCs). The NGC model provided a mecha-
nism to guarantee a feedstock supply. As the
industry developed, and investors’ under-
standing of the grain marketing system im-
proved, project developers shifted toward
business models which could access non-
producer capital while relying on open market
purchases for the grain supply. Developers of
cellulosic ethanol projects will face a two-
pronged challenge of much higher capital re-
quirements along with the development of a
feedstock supply. In the classic ‘‘chickenversus
egg’’ situation, producers are unlikely to invest
in establishing an energy crop with a long time
horizon until the local market is secure. Pri-
vate investors will be reluctant to invest in pro-
duction facilities unless feedstock uncertainty
can be resolved. One alternative is for the cel-
lulosic facility to contract for long-term pro-
duction. However, this would significantly in-
crease the capital requirements of the plant. A
better alternative is likely to be a business
model that provides the feedstock producers an
ownership position and profit motivation linked
to the project performance.
Hybrid business forms involving both pro-
ducer and private investor owners will likely be
required in order to access sufficient capital.
These structures provide two classes of owner-
ship: outside equity investors and patron stock-
holders. The entity returns are split between the
two classes with the outside investors receiving
investment-based returns and the patron stock-
holders receiving patronage-based distributions.
This structure is part of a broader classification
termed ‘‘investor-share cooperatives,’’ which ac-
cess outside equity through preferred stock,
nonvoting common stock, and participation cer-
tificates (Chaddad and Cook, 2003).
A number of states, including Wyoming,
Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Tennessee, have
enacted legislation enablingcooperative/Limited
Liability Company (LLC) hybrids. Efforts to
develop a uniform federal law for this structure
are underway by the National Council of Farmer
Cooperatives. While there are differences in in-
dividual state statutes, this structure mandates
control by farmer members but can allow the
investor class to receive up to 85% of the profits
(Hensley and Swanson, 2003).
While the structure for combining producer
and private investor capital exists, the success of
these models is largely unproven. Issues in-
volving feedstock pricing, plant location, profit
distribution and control can become controver-
sial. Both groups, producers and private in-
vestors, seek to maximize their returns and
minimize their risks as investment criteria. The
cellulosic ethanol industry may provide the
proving ground for the development of hybrid
business models which meet the competing
needsofproducerandprivateinvestormembers.
Conclusions
Despite the extensive discussion of cellulosic
ethanol production issues, and strong initial
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financing the expansion of the U.S. renewable
fuel infrastructure in a relatively short time-
frame has been largely ignored by the litera-
ture. Financing cellulosic ethanol is a major
challenge, an order of magnitude greater than
the development of rural electrification. Among
thechallenges are unproven profit potential, the
lack of a commercialized and standardized con-
version technology, high capital cost for plant
construction, feedstock establishment and feed-
stock logistics, and the difficulties in attracting
capital to an emerging, unproven industry.
Overcoming these challenges will require a
policy environment providing continuing and
stable incentives, rapid standardization of tech-
nology, and the development of business mod-
els which simultaneously stimulate investment
in feedstock and processing facilities. How-
ever, much like the electrification of rural
America, these challenges can be overcome
with long-term planning and a clear under-
standing of the ordering of tasks necessary to
reach a national goal.
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